A view of a sand sculpture depicting Donald Trump at Puri beach in Odisha on November 6, 2024 after he won the U.S. Presidential elections.
| Photo Credit: Reuters

Five years after Prime Minister Narendra Modi told a crowd in Houston, Texas, that India had “connected well” with Republican candidate Donald Trump and followed it up with “Abki Baar Trump Sarkar (This time, a Trump government)”, Mr. Trump has gained the votes required to become the U.S.’s 47th President. Mr. Modi’s statement reflected the bonhomie that the two leaders shared throughout Mr. Trump’s first tenure. But when we go beyond personal ties to bilateral ties, ‘Trump 1.0’ was a mixed bag for India. New Delhi will no doubt welcome Trump 2.0, even as it braces for the impact of some of his methods, such as using social media to open coercion in order to drive home a point.

Where the road will be smooth

There are several reasons for the Modi government to be delighted with Mr. Trump’s victory. The President-elect has made it clear that he intends to build on his past history with India, which will include building trade ties, opening up more technology for Indian companies, and making more U.S. military hardware available for Indian defence forces. He will pick up the broken threads of negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement, which saw intense negotiations in 2019-2020 before he lost power, and which former President Joe Biden showed no interest in continuing. Rather than pushing India on carbon emission cuts, Mr. Trump is likely to encourage India to buy into U.S. oil and LNG, along the lines of the Memorandum of Understanding for the Driftwood LNG plant in Louisiana in 2019, which would have brought $2.5 billion in investment from Petronet India into the U.S. but was shelved a year later.

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Under Mr. Trump, India-U.S. ties are also unlikely to face less trouble over issues such as democratic norms, minority rights, press freedoms, and human rights, which the Modi government faced from the Biden administration and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Nor will they need to worry about queries on the treatment of climate and human rights NGOs hit by the Foreign (Contribution) Regulation Act, 2010, although there may be some questions asked by Republican Congressmen who are concerned about U.S. Christian NGOs operating in India. New Delhi will also hope that public comments by the U.S. State Department and Department of Justice on the Pannun-Nijjar cases will be more muted. While the trial involving alleged middleman, Nikhil Gupta, for the aborted assassination attempt on Khalistani activist Gurpatwant Pannun last year would continue, founder of the Republican Hindu Coalition, Shalabh ‘Shaili’ Kumar, has said that he expects Mr. Trump to “crackdown” on Khalistani groups. Moreover, Mr. Trump’s frosty ties in the past with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau indicate that New Delhi would not have to worry about a reaction from Washington over its ongoing diplomatic war with Ottawa over the Nijjar killing.

Potential trouble areas

So, where could the trouble come from? The first problem is Mr. Trump’s persistent focus on cutting trade tariffs, which saw his administration impose a series of counter-tariffs, file World Trade Organization complaints, and then withdraw India’s GSP status for exporters.

The second is his habit of disclosing the contents of private conversations with leaders and, on occasion, embellishing them or even imagining them. For instance, he mocked Mr. Modi on the issue of lowering of duties on Harley Davidson motorcycles and badgered India to lift the ban on Hydroxychloroquine exports, which did not go down well in New Delhi.

This habit took a more serious turn when it involved other countries. In 2019, Mr. Trump told Pakistan’s then Prime Minister, Imran Khan, that they could “resolve the Kashmir issue”, and that Mr. Modi had asked him to mediate in the matter (India vehemently denied the assertion). In 2020, after China transgressed the Line of Actual Control and began a military stand-off with India, Mr. Trump posted that Mr. Modi was “not in a good mood” over the developments; India denied that the two leaders had spoken at all. Diplomats, however, point out that Mr. Trump did back India in the conflict, ensuring that the U.S. shared intelligence, leased drones, and supplied winter gear for the forces “in a manner different from past U.S. administrations”.

Perhaps the most testing times were during the U.S.’s tensions with Iran: in June 2018, he sent the then United Nations envoy, Nikki Haley, on a mission to New Delhi to virtually threaten India with sanctions. Subsequently, India “zeroed out” its oil imports from both Iran and Venezuela.

In some relief, New Delhi is likely to face little pressure now on cutting ties with Moscow, given Mr. Trump’s interest in engaging the Russian President. India will also seek Mr. Trump’s intervention in ending Israel’s war in Gaza and Lebanon, and reopening talks with Gulf countries, to help revive its plans for the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor, now virtually moribund.

India’s neighbours may be more concerned about the impact of Mr. Trump’s victory. During his last tenure, he had cancelled most of the U.S. aid to Pakistan. Now, the Shahbaz Sharif government would worry about losing U.S. support on loans from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank as well. In Bangladesh, Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, a close friend of Democratic Party leaders, has already run afoul of Mr. Trump, who posted on social media last week about Dhaka’s failure to protect Hindu minorities. The Biden government had expanded its outreach in South Asian countries, such as Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives. In that sense, many in the region may worry not so much about U.S. actions, but a lack of attention from the new administration.

suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in